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Why (Not)  
Political Philosophy?
David Bromell
Introduction
Why political philosophy? Why do I read it, teach it and 
encourage others to engage in it? Simply, because I am driven 
to it by my practice as a public servant. I have spent a great 
deal of my working life in meetings where we discuss, decide 
or make judgements about public policy. I notice how often 
we express or imply ‘big ideas’ in our discussions with one 
another, but mostly in an unthinking (even unconscious) way. 
So we skate over confusions and contradictions in our own 
and others’ thought and too frequently talk past each other. 
The difficulty is compounded because 
none of us comes to public policy debate 
with a ‘blank slate’. Like the vast majority 
of the people I deal with in public life, I 
want to make a difference. That already 
implies value judgements about states 
of affairs, desired outcomes, preferred 
means to get from here to there and 
responsibilities to make it happen. Those 
are matters on which I not only observe 
conflict between people (and political 
parties), but also experience conflict 
within myself – second thoughts; my own 
divided opinions; discrepancies between 
what I think I think, and the courses of 
action I end up pursuing in fact. It is 
this experience of conflict, confusion, 
inconsistencies, incompleteness and 
contradiction that drives me to critical 
reflection in general, and to political 
philosophy in particular.
So what exactly is political philosophy, 
and how do we do it?
Definition of terms
Before we can address the question, ‘What 
is political philosophy?’ we need to tackle 
a prior question, ‘What is philosophy?’ 
Sellars suggested that ‘The aim of 
philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to 
Take, for example, current debate about 
physician-assisted suicide and active, 
voluntary euthanasia. Complex ideas are 
at play about liberty, the autonomy of the 
individual, volition and consent, human 
dignity, the ‘sacredness’ of life, death and 
dying, medical ethics and the state’s duty 
of care to vulnerable individuals. 
When we stumble over big ideas or 
trip over unexamined assumptions, I 
want to slow down and think, to take 
time to sort out my own thinking until 
I can see clearly what is at stake in an 
argument, where our real differences lie, 
and hopefully shed some light on this for 
others too.  
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understand how things in the broadest 
possible sense of the term hang together 
in the broadest possible sense of the term’ 
(Sellars, 1963, p.1). Philosophy tries to 
think and speak clearly about the nature, 
goals and possibilities of our various ways 
of dealing with self, others and the all-
encompassing whole (‘world’) in which 
we find ourselves. As Larmore puts it:
Its ambition is therefore to be 
maximally reflective: philosophy 
differs from other kinds of inquiry 
in that it aims to render explicit 
and critically evaluate the implicit 
assumptions on which they, as well as 
our experience as a whole, happen to 
rely. (Larmore, 2012, pp.5-6)
In other words, when we ‘do 
philosophy’ (i.e., think philosophically) 
we take a step back from being, feeling, 
knowing, thinking, deciding, speaking 
and acting, to reflect in a conscious, 
reasoning way on what we express and 
imply more or less unconsciously when 
we lead our lives in the company of others 
in a particular place and time, influenced 
by this or that culture, tradition and habit 
of thought and life.
Doing philosophy is like using a 
camera in manual mode instead of 
using its automatic (‘point and shoot’) 
settings.1 When I want to capture a 
fleeting moment quickly and efficiently in 
more or less standard lighting conditions, 
‘point and shoot’ generally does a good 
job. But arresting photos – photos that 
make you want to stop and look twice 
– require intention, thought, knowledge, 
training and practised skill. I need to ‘step 
back’ from the scene or object I wish to 
photograph and think in a deliberate way 
about composition, perspective, lighting, 
depth of field, ISO setting, aperture setting 
and shutter speed, then use manual mode 
to create the image. Manual mode is more 
flexible than ‘point and shoot’, but it is 
not a quick or ‘efficient’ process. It takes 
time, thought and energy (and patience 
on the part of a travelling companion). 
Using manual mode is not something I 
choose to do every time I use a camera. 
Similarly, I do not reflect consciously 
and critically on every moment of my 
being, feeling, knowing, thinking, deciding, 
speaking and acting. That would be an 
inefficient and paralysing way of leading 
my life, and exceptionally irritating to 
those who live and work with me. But 
there are moments when switching out 
of automatic mode enables more flexible 
and creative responses to the challenges 
and questions life and work throw at 
us. Standing back and thinking things 
through helps us discern alternatives and 
ways forward that create public value 
(Bromell, 2012), that are more flexible and 
fit for purpose, better and sometimes even 
wiser than those we might have opted for 
in ‘point and shoot’ mode. 
So what, then, is ‘political philosophy’? 
‘Politics’, and its adjective ‘political’, refers 
to institutions, processes, methods and 
behaviours that govern (i.e., enable 
organised control over) or influence 
human social organisation. Politics 
particularly concerns the allocation, 
distribution and use of power, resources 
and status, between individuals, voluntary 
associations (e.g. families and community 
groups) and states (non-voluntary 
associations which include everyone 
within a given territory and exercise 
coercive power over them). Political 
philosophy is thus critical reflection on 
human political organisation, coercion 
and the legitimate use of force, and the 
distribution of power, resources, duties 
and honours within a society. Political 
philosophy does this, as Bhikhu Parekh 
explains, not by pontificating but by: 
clarifying issues, analysing the 
language in which they are framed, 
exposing specious arguments and 
offering better ones, examining and 
criticizing the political principles 
in terms of which political actors 
take and defend their decisions, and 
articulating a historically relevant 
and possible vision of a good society. 
(Parekh, 2008, p.7)
One reason to do political philosophy 
is to think critically about the ideologies 
(or belief systems) that guide, enable – 
and constrain – so much of our everyday 
thinking and deciding. An ideology is a 
set of doctrines or beliefs about how the 
world (or some part of it) works which 
forms the basis of a political, economic 
or other system. Ideologies are largely 
assumed and often taken for granted. 
They provide shortcuts to thinking that 
help us make sense (in a more or less 
unreflective way), and guide our decisions 
and actions. They are like automatic 
settings on the camera.2 
Most ideologies are adjectives 
that have been turned into nouns 
ending in -ism: capitalism, socialism, 
liberalism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, 
egalitarianism, communitarianism, 
biculturalism, etc. Political philosophy 
switches the camera to manual mode, 
and sets out to recover the adjective, and 
the ideas, behind and between the -isms. 
As David Miller (1998) puts it: 
No political philosopher can break 
free entirely from the grip of 
ideology, but political philosophy 
must involve a more critical scrutiny 
of the intellectual links that hold 
ideologies together, and a bringing 
to light of the unstated assumptions 
that underpin them.
In practice, this characteristically 
means I am driven to do political 
philosophy reactively (Cohen, 2011), 
because I have become frustrated with 
how things are compared with how I 
think they ought to be; perplexed about 
‘the right thing to do’; puzzled about 
how to resolve arguments and conflict 
in the public sphere; or because I am 
having second thoughts about my own 
perceptions, moral intuitions and 
judgements. We argue with ourselves, 
Doing philosophy is like using a camera 
in manual mode instead of using its 
automatic (‘point and shoot’) settings.
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and we argue with one another, about 
‘the right thing to do’, how much 
government is good for us, and just 
ways of organising our interactions and 
dependencies on one another. Confusion, 
and wanting to sort it out, is the impulse 
to political philosophy (Sandel, 2009, 
p.28). Or, as Jean-François Lyotard puts 
it, philosophy springs from lack and 
desire:
The reality of philosophy results 
solely from the unreality of reality, 
so to speak; it results from the lack 
experienced in reality, it springs from 
the way that desire for something 
else, for another organization of the 
relations between human beings, a 
desire that is at work in society, does 
not manage to free itself from the old 
social forms. (Lyotard, 2013, p.107)
While political philosophy as critical 
reflection seeks to think its way from the 
concrete to the abstract, the particular to 
the general, unless it remains grounded 
in and relevant to actual situations and 
relationships, ‘haunted by reality’ and the 
lacks and desires of real people, then it 
risks leading us back to ideology (ibid., 
p.106) rather than away from it. 
This in turn suggests that the task of 
political philosophy is unconcluded and 
unconcludable. The questions confronted 
by political philosophy are difficult, 
intellectually as well as practically. While 
political philosophy cannot hope to 
resolve disagreements once and for all, it 
can give shape to our political arguments 
and bring moral clarity to the choices we 
confront as citizens (Sandel, 2009, p.19). 
Distinct but related disciplines
Moral philosophy, as Robert Nozick 
argued, sets the background for, and 
boundaries of, political philosophy: 
What persons may and may not 
do to one another limits what they 
may do through the apparatus of 
a state, or do to establish such an 
apparatus. The moral prohibitions 
it is permissible to enforce are the 
source of whatever legitimacy the 
state’s fundamental coercive power 
has. (Nozick, 1974, p.6)
In other words, political philosophy 
reflects on how society should be organised 
in light of ideas about how individuals 
should treat each other (Sandel, 2009, 
p.6). It involves ‘deliberations over the 
principles that frame how we are live to 
with each other’ (James, 2006, p.294). 
This understanding of political 
philosophy is, however, contentious. 
Larmore (2012) has analysed and 
commented on two rival conceptions 
of political philosophy, which reflect 
disagreement on how moral philosophy 
and political philosophy are related and 
how they are to be distinguished.
1. Political philosophy is applied moral 
philosophy that aims to lay out 
the purposes (ends) that political 
association ought to pursue and the 
principles of an ideal, just or ‘well-
ordered’ society. 
2. Political philosophy is an 
autonomous discipline that 
deals with means, rather than 
ends; specifically, the social and 
political institutions that enable 
us to live together despite our 
different interests and fundamental 
disagreements over moral ideals.
According to Larmore, the first 
approach can be seen in Aristotle 
(Politics, I.1-3; Nichomachean Ethics, 
I.2, X.9), and had strong advocates in 
Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls (1971) and 
Jerry (G.A.) Cohen (2009, 2011). The 
second approach can be seen in Weber 
(Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, I.1.2., pp.12-
17) and in Hobbes’ opting for law as a 
‘common standard’ rather than ethics 
(Leviathan, introduction and I.xiii.8), 
and has been advocated more recently by 
Bernard Williams (2005) and Raymond 
Geuss (2008).3
The two approaches seem to me to 
involve an unnecessary and false antinomy. 
My practice as a public servant drives 
me to reflect on both ends and means: 
on the purposes we hope to achieve, 
and the methods we adopt to achieve 
them; on institutions, and the character 
of those who serve in them; on where 
we might reach reasonable agreement, 
and how we might create and maintain 
institutions that enable us to live well with 
our reasonable disagreements. We see a 
both/and approach to ends and means 
in, for example, James Madison’s twin 
observations in The Federalist, no.51 that:
Justice is the end of government. It 
is the end of civil society. It ever has 
been and ever will be pursued until it 
be obtained, or until liberty be lost in 
the pursuit. [= ends]
If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary … 
In forming a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself. [= 
means] (Madison, 1787, pp.340, 337)
Above and beyond any choice between 
focusing on ideal social arrangements 
and focusing on the choice and design 
of institutions, the critical issue is the 
extent to which people can actually lead 
lives they have reason to value (Sen, 
2009, pp.18, 231-47). The fundamental 
question for political philosophy is, 
Above and beyond any choice between 
focusing on ideal social arrangements 
and focusing on the choice and design of 
institutions, the critical issue is the extent to 
which people can actually lead lives they 
have reason to value ...
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therefore, how together we might live, 
live well and live better, despite our 
reasonable disagreements about ends, 
means, the legitimacy of our institutional 
arrangements and the character of those 
who serve in them. Ultimate aims, 
theories of justice and visions of the 
good society matter; so do institutions, 
their operation and legitimacy (Waldron, 
2013, 1999). 
Consequently, the questions I 
keep returning to when I do political 
philosophy cluster around both justice 
and ‘the good society’ (ends), and 
government, institutions and public 
policy making (means).
Justice and ‘the good society’
•	 Who	owes	what	to	whom	(other	
humans, non-human creatures and 
the physical environment)?
•	 What	is	a	‘good	society’,	and	what	do	
we mean by ‘the public interest’ and 
‘the common good’?
•	 What	is	‘private’	and	what	is	‘public’?
•	 Which	principles	might	guide	how	
we distribute income and wealth, 
benefits and burdens, rights and 
responsibilities, powers and duties, 
punishments and rewards, offices and 
honours?
•	 What	do	‘equality’	and	‘a	fair	go’	
mean?
•	 What	does	‘justice’	mean	in	a	
globalising world?
Government, institutions and public policy 
making
•	 What	is	the	most	desirable	(or	least	
undesirable) form of government, 
and how much government is good 
for us?
•	 How	might	we	best	design	political	
institutions in order to balance ‘me’ 
and ‘us’, the private and the public, 
freedom and individual liberty with 
belonging, community and social 
responsibility? 
•	 How	is	a	liberal	state	to	deal	with	
diversity, and with both ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘unreasonable’ disagreement (‘us’ 
and ‘them’)?
•	 When	and	by	whom	can	coercion	
legitimately be exercised, and what 
are the limits to a state’s legitimate 
use of force?
•	 What	should	we	assume	about	
human nature in policy and politics? 
•	 Which	qualities	are	desirable	in	
elected and appointed officials?
•	 How	should	policy	making	proceed	
when people disagree on values, 
objectives and priorities?
The tasks and characteristic 
preoccupations of political philosophy 
as outlined above suggest why and 
how political philosophy is distinct 
from the related discipline of political 
science (or political studies). Political 
science concerns itself with comparative, 
empirical analysis and understanding of 
institutions and institutional choices, 
often through pragmatic or consequential 
assessment. Waldron argues that political 
philosophy pushes beyond political 
science by engaging in ‘certain elements 
of non-consequential assessment’:
Here I have in mind the deeper layers 
of dignitarian value, for example, 
that explain why certain processes 
like democratic decision-making 
and the rule of law are important 
quite apart from their outputs and 
quite apart from their efficiency. 
We have to consider ways in which 
various institutional alternatives 
embody various kinds of respect 
for the persons upon whom and in 
whose name our laws and policies 
are administered – respect for them 
as persons, as agents, as centers of 
intelligence, and respect for their 
dignity as individuals. (Waldron, 
2013, p.12)
Political philosophy is normative 
theory, oriented towards critiquing and 
changing social arrangements, not merely 
describing or explaining them. Normative 
theory draws our attention to alternative 
visions of social relations (Young, 1990, 
p.226), to ‘realistic utopias’ that extend 
what are ordinarily thought to be the 
limits of political practicability and, in so 
doing, reconcile us with our political and 
social condition (Rawls, 1999, pp.11-12). 
Political philosophy brings ethics back 
into the centre of politics.
Why not political philosophy?
Good government does not happen by 
accident. It happens because men and 
women commit themselves to public 
life and public service, to responsibility 
with accountability, to the maintenance 
and renewal of political traditions and 
political institutions, to action and to 
reflection. Given the challenges of public 
life in this place, at this time, how can we 
not commit at least some of our time and 
energy to read widely, think deeply and 
communicate clearly about the ends and 
means of politics?
Exercising ethical leadership in 
politics and public service requires us 
to make transparent, to ourselves and to 
others, where our interests lie, including 
the visions, values, ideas, ideals and 
commitments that drive and sustain us. 
When we are self-consciously reflective 
about these things we are less likely to 
talk past each other, less likely to assume 
that we mean and want the same things, 
better able to identify where our real 
differences lie, and better prepared to 
engage in robust appraisal of policy 
options and to articulate a clear value 
proposition for policy proposals. Doing 
political philosophy trains the mind for 
critical thinking in public life, as a prelude 
to considered, intentional action. 
The invitation and encouragement to 
do political philosophy comes, however, 
with a note of caution. Doing philosophy 
requires both curiosity and courage. It 
Doing political philosophy trains the 
mind for critical thinking in public life, 
as a prelude to considered, intentional 
action.
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requires curiosity about why we do this 
and not that; why we have settled for a 
particular social, economic or political 
arrangement; why we feel strongly about 
X and find idea Y repugnant; what 
our everyday speech reveals about our 
underlying assumptions and structures of 
thought; how jargon has come to infect 
our thought and speech; why people feel 
differently and think differently from 
others; and how we can live differently 
together without violence. 
Doing philosophy also requires 
courage – courage to think differently, 
to change your mind. Because, having 
admitted an idea to thought, having 
entertained it and let it take root in 
you, an idea may change your priorities, 
commitments and way of life. For many, 
that will be sufficient reason not to do 
political philosophy. Doing philosophy is 
for those who relish adventures of ideas, 
who experience being nudged and tugged 
by the longing for something more and 
better than what we already know, and 
think, and do:
This is why we philosophize: because 
there is desire, because there is 
absence in presence, deadness in 
life; and also because there is our 
power that is not yet power; and also 
because there is alienation, the loss 
of what we thought we had acquired 
and the gap between the deed and 
the doing, between the said and the 
saying; and finally because we cannot 
evade this: testifying to the presence 
of the lack with our speech. In 
truth, how can we not philosophize? 
(Lyotard, 2013, p.123)
1 Joshua Greene (2013, ch.5) uses this metaphor to describe 
how the moral brain works. Automatic settings are efficient 
but inflexible; manual mode is flexible but inefficient. This 
is one way of elaborating what Daniel Kahneman means by 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).
2 Although the word ‘ideology’ was only coined in the 1790s in 
the context of the French revolution, more or less conscious 
ideas about ‘the good society’ and ideal social, economic and 
political arrangements have been in evidence since at least 
the 10th century BCE.
3 Jeremy Waldron (2013), following Hume (1742), sketches 
a similar contrast between focusing political theory on 
institutions or on the character of those who inhabit them 
(the virtues). 
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